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Detention, and 
Fundamental Fairness 
Deborah Pearlstein* 
The past decade of U.S. counterterrorism policy and practice has aggravated an already 
vigorous debate about the extent to which domestic or international human rights law (HRL) 
applies alongside international humanitarian law (IHL) during times of armed conflict. HRL, 
reflected in domestic legal texts like the U.S. Constitution, and treaties to which the United 
States is a party, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is 
designed to safeguard a baseline set of individual rights. The laws protect, for example, 
against arbitrary detention or deprivation of life.1 IHL, in contrast, has long been described as 
lex specialis, a specific set of rules designed to operate only in times of armed conflict, which 
IHL contemplates is a state of affairs distinct from ordinary political conditions.2 Based 
centrally on the idea that states of armed conflict are exceptional, IHL permits some 
conduct—such as killing under certain circumstances—that HRL and other applicable laws 
prohibit.3 
                                                                                                                               
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This Comment is based on 
remarks delivered on February 3, 2012, at the Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
Symposium, Emerging Issues in International Humanitarian Law. 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
 2. See generally GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
WAR (2010).  
 3. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (targeting rules); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (targeting provisions). 
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While it might once have been possible to imagine that IHL simply supplanted HRL 
during armed conflict, acting as the exclusive body of law governing the conduct of warring 
parties and occupying forces, the rapid development of HRL after World War II, coupled with 
the proliferation of non-traditional armed conflicts, have helped drive the development of a 
consensus view that both bodies of law matter in times of armed conflict.4 But the consensus 
on how they matter is far from specific. How do the laws interact? When they can be read as 
complimentary? In particular, which law should prevail in the event specific rules in 
application conflict? All of these questions remain the subject of much scholarship and 
dispute.5 
Geoffrey Corn and Peter Chickris write against the background of this important 
discussion, making a valuably provocative and specific case about how best to resolve one 
issue implicating both bodies of law: Whether detainees held in a non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC) should be afforded counsel in processes designed to determine their status in 
detention.6 As the authors point out, the right-to-counsel question is especially timely. With a 
view toward regulating the United States’ current engagement in Afghanistan and beyond, 
the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides that an “unprivileged enemy 
belligerent may . . . be represented by military counsel” at status hearings.7 In March of 2012, 
the U.S. Department of Defense issued a preliminary report anticipating the implementation 
of the NDAA right-to-counsel provision.8 As that report explains, the United States has 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Afghanistan by which 
all Afghan nationals held at the main U.S. detention facility at Parwan will be transferred to 
Afghan custody by September 2012. But that agreement does not appear to apply to the 
group of third country nationals still held at Parwan.9 And the U.S. government leaves open 
the possibility that the procedures would apply to the kind of long-term detention (lasting 
beyond the present operations in Afghanistan) that concerns Corn and Chickris.10 For these 
reasons alone, issues surrounding both the wisdom and legality of affording long-term NIAC 
detainees access to military counsel remain of importance.11 
                                                                                                                               
 4. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship 
between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883 (2012); 
Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights 
Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 52, 57, 59–61 (2010) (describing 
pressure since World War II to extend human rights principles to the context of armed conflict); Dan 
E. Stigall et al., Human Rights and Military Decisions: Counterinsurgency and Trends in the Law of 
International Armed Conflict, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1367 (2009). 
 5. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 4 (summarizing competing views).  
 6. Geoffrey S. Corn & Peter A. Chickris, Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive Detention, and 
Fundamental Fairness: Rethinking the Review Tribunal Representation Model, 11 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 99 (2012).  
 7. Id. at 103 (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 
1024(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1565 (2011)).  
 8. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE PROCEDURES FOR UNPRIVILEGED ENEMY BELLIGERENT STATUS 
DETERMINATIONS (March 2012) (on file with author).  
 9. See id. at 2. 
 10. See generally id. 
11. Indeed, as of this writing, concerns remain about whether the transfer of prisoners from American 
to Afghan hands has been completed. See Rod Nordland, Karzai Orders Afghan Forces to Take 
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Corn and Chickris’ proposed solution—that belligerents in NIAC be afforded counsel as a 
matter of policy, but not as a matter of right—is their attempt to reconcile competing 
interests of which they are acutely aware. They acknowledge the concern of military 
practitioners—that recognizing the applicability of even some HRL rules in even one kind of 
armed conflict will, through the development of customary international law, come to 
constrain armed conflict operations in other settings where such constraints have been 
thought neither historically required nor practically applicable.12 Yet drawing on the 
historical interests in fundamental fairness animating the counsel rights in the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as on the strategic interests in accuracy they see as essential to effective 
counterterrorism, the authors seek to bolster detention procedures in NIAC settings in order 
to reduce risks of arbitrariness.13  
Their article is a helpfully concrete contribution to the debate about the relationship 
between HRL and IHL. Particularly in the face of remarkable reluctance by some U.S. courts 
to acknowledge arguments that additional legal process may in some circumstances advance, 
not hinder, executive interests, the policy case in favor of counsel for long-term detainees is 
compelling. It is especially so coming from, in Corn’s case, a retired Lt. Colonel with twenty-
two years of military service, including his tenure as the Army’s senior law of war expert in 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Yet in the end, the authors’ claims prove too much 
about the state of the law to defend their policy-only case. The logical import of their 
argument is that there are not only legal principles supporting a right to counsel in this 
setting that may be drawn from, for example, U.S. constitutional law, there is law itself. Put 
differently, the policy reasons that the authors give for why military counsel may be usefully, 
and practicably, provided squarely advance the legal argument that counsel must be 
provided. By the article’s own terms then, it may not be possible to split the policy interest 
from the legal atom. The remainder of these remarks elaborates. 
Detention Policy and Law 
The authors elect to draw on both policy interests and legal principles in advancing their 
case that counsel is appropriate in particular NIAC detention settings. On policy grounds 
alone, the authors highlight a set of potential benefits they expect to flow from the availability 
of legal representation in long-term NIAC detention regimes: better fact-finding through a 
more adversarial process, a more developed factual record to aid subsequent review, improved 
accuracy and efficiency in detention determinations for the military, and enhanced credibility 
of the detention regime (and therefore the U.S. counterterrorism mission) overall.14 On this 
last benefit: As the then-Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, U.S. General Stanley 
McChrystal, explained in his pivotal strategy report in 2009, “the Afghan people see U.S. 
                                                                                                                               
Control of American-Built Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/asia/karzai-orders-takeover-of-afghan-prison.html?_r=0.  
 12. Corn & Chickris, supra note 6, at 165. 
 13. See generally id. 
 14. Id.  
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detention operations as secretive and lacking in due process.”15 Because detention operations 
could thus become “a strategic liability,” the United States faces a “critical” need “to conduct 
all detentions [sic] operations in this country in accordance with international and national 
law.”16 McChrystal went on to recommend the course of action that is now coming to pass, 
namely, the turnover of detention operations to the Afghans.17 
Correspondingly, the authors address and reject the likelihood that practical challenges—
such as inadequate military resources or personnel—pose a serious obstacle to the inclusion 
of counsel in the process.18 
Military lawyers, or JAGs, are a finite resource in any operational context. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on rule of law and legally compliant operations has imposed 
a greater demand on these lawyers today than ever before, a burden that will almost 
certainly become even more demanding in the future. As a result, imposing an 
additional requirement on this finite pool of lawyers should not be done casually. 
. . . However, this responsibility will provide a valuable opportunity for these lawyers to 
engage in a function that hones core advocacy and operational competencies. It may 
also be logical to leverage the already existing military trial defense services to assume 
this duty, perhaps with augmentation from reserve component activated on a rotational 
basis to represent detainees. Like all missions in the military, once it is prioritized 
there is simply no question it will be effectively accomplished.19 
Given the salience of such interests, the authors could readily have elected to rest their 
case on the policy argument alone. Instead, their central argument draws on the lessons of 
U.S. constitutional law and, in particular, the protection of individual rights. As they put it: 
“[Z]ealous representation is an essential safeguard to protect the interests of individuals 
subjected to incarceration. . . . [It] represents something so closely related to due process as to 
be nearly inseparable.”20 The article thus discusses in some detail how both Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence protect the right to counsel, not only in criminal trials, but also in 
settings such as pretrial detention and immigration proceedings.21 
Given the importance of the individual interest they identify, what, then, is the authors’ 
argument for why these constitutional rights do not apply as a matter of law for detainees 
held by the United States in Afghanistan? To this question, the article offers little response. 
In Sixth Amendment terms, the answer is perhaps straightforward enough; the Amendment 
by its terms of course only guarantees defendants a right to counsel “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions,”22 which NIAC detentions are manifestly not. In contrast, the Supreme Court’s 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which the authors cite favorably, is not as plainly 
inapposite. As the authors understand, the Court has made clear that the requirements of 
                                                                                                                               
 15. Commander’s Initial Assessment, enclosed in Letter from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, 
Afghanistan/Int’l Sec. Assistance Forces, to Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Annex at F-1 (Aug. 
30, 2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. Annext at F-4.  
 18. Corn & Chickris, supra note 6, at 166. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 135, 138. 
 21. Id.  
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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procedural due process must be evaluated not only in the context of criminal or punitive 
proceedings per se, but in any circumstances where the government affects the deprivation of 
liberty.23 “[I]t is the risk of incarceration, and not necessarily the punitive purpose for the 
incarceration, that implicates the critical importance of zealous representation.”24 
The more promising argument against the legal attachment of a Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel under these circumstances—one unmentioned in the article—turns on the question of 
the Constitution’s extraterritorial application. As the D.C. Circuit concluded in the 2010 case 
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the Constitution does not extend to Afghanistan to afford detainees held 
at the U.S. military base at Parwan a right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. federal 
court.25 The holding was based on an application of the standard for assessing extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution set forth by the Supreme Court two years earlier in 
Boumediene v. Bush.26 As the Boumediene Court explained, the extraterritorial scope of the 
constitutional habeas right depends on a set of factors: “(1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; 
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”27 
To be sure, the question of “practical obstacles” is only one of several factors identified as 
relevant to the constitutional inquiry set forth in Boumediene.28 But in rejecting the 
extension of habeas to U.S.-held detainees in Afghanistan, it was this factor—the “practical 
obstacles” in affording such review—that the Al Maqaleh court found most persuasive. While 
acknowledging that at least two of the detainee-petitioners in that case had been picked up 
far outside Afghan borders (one, notably, in Thailand), and only came to be in the Afghan 
theater because the U.S. government brought them there, the court concluded that the 
“practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ” while 
petitioners were detained in an active theater of war weighed against recognizing an 
extraterritorial constitutional right to habeas.29 
Curiously, the Al Maqaleh court declined to explain in any detail the specific “practical 
obstacles” it foresaw. Rather, the D.C. Circuit panel rested its analysis heavily on a passage 
from the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, in which the Supreme 
Court refused to allow U.S. military detainees held in Germany (following their war crimes 
convictions in China) to seek habeas in U.S. courts.30 In particular, the Al Maqaleh court 
quoted in block the following passage from Eisentrager in support of its conclusion that 
habeas was impractical: 
                                                                                                                               
 23. “Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) 
(O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)); see also id. 
at 539 (concluding that Hamdi “unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with 
the proceedings on remand”). 
 24. Corn & Chickris, supra note 6, at 137. 
 25. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 26. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 27. Id. at 766. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97. 
 30. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (2012) 
186 
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They 
would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with 
wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call 
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the 
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the 
result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military 
opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.31 
In suggesting that habeas for Parwan would “bring aid and comfort to the enemy” and 
“diminish the prestige of our commanders” in Afghanistan, the appeals court did not refer to 
any particular fact or claim in the record before it.32 Neither was it discernibly deferring to 
some perceived superiority of the Executive’s assessment of the strategic or practical import 
of allowing the Parwan detainees captured outside Afghanistan to seek a writ of habeas 
corpus. Instead, the D.C. Circuit seemed to be doing exactly what the Eisentrager Court did 
sixty years earlier—asserting, based on the court’s own impression, that greater legal process 
would only hamper the strategic cause for which the United States is fighting in (on this 
occasion) Afghanistan. 
The policy case in favor of counsel that Corn and Chickris advance contrasts starkly with 
the assumptions made by the D.C. Circuit—assumptions central to the legal calculus as to 
whether U.S.-held detainees are entitled to constitutional protections, like access to military 
counsel, as a matter of right. By the authors’ terms, the “feasibility” of including military 
counsel in detention review processes should pose no critical obstacle to incorporating them 
into detention operations in Afghanistan. Given this, it is unclear whether it is possible for 
the authors to maintain the case that detainees should have access to counsel as a matter of 
policy but not as a matter of law. 
Viewed from this perspective, it is also less clear why the authors would want to insist on 
such a distinction. Acknowledging a limited due process right to counsel in this setting has at 
most modest implications for the broader HRL/IHL debate. A right so limited—access to 
military counsel, in long-term NIAC detention, only when practicalities allow—imports only a 
singular procedural protection from the vast array of process guarantees that wholesale 
application of HRL would afford. Furthermore, advancing their claim in legal terms, on the 
strength of the policy case, might have an added benefit. At least since Eisentrager, the 
federal courts have at times adopted a paradoxical approach to security-related cases: They 
deny having the competence to evaluate competing arguments about the practical 
implications of a legal rule, so instead of considering what particular facts might be available 
about present circumstances, they rely on judicial instinct alone to guide the necessarily 
practical elements of the judgment they must make.33 Faced with serious, competing 
                                                                                                                               
 31. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779). 
 32. Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 561 (2006) (rejecting the government’s argument that the 
application of court martial procedures in trials of terrorist suspects would be “impracticable” as 
lacking record support).  
 33. See Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84; see also Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Silberman, J., concurring) (accepting the executive’s use of the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard for establishing proof of detainability, but finding the government’s expectation of 
collecting such evidence unduly burdensome). “[T]here are powerful reasons for the government to 
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arguments on the details of process implementation, the courts would have at least an 
opportunity to engage less presumptively, and more meaningfully, on the law of the possible 
in armed conflict. 
Conclusion 
Neither the problems surrounding NIAC detention, nor questions about the role of the 
courts in resolving them, is going away anytime soon. Whether in the conflict in Afghanistan, 
or in other conflicts between states and non-state groups, the challenge of reconciling HRL 
and IHL will remain. Delving into the details of rights application in conflict settings, Corn 
and Chickris’ work helps make clear that considerations of fundamental fairness need not be 
absent from wartime law. 
  
                                                                                                                               
rely on our opinion in Al–Adahi v. Obama which persuasively explains that in a habeas corpus 
proceeding the preponderance of evidence standard that the government assumes binds it, is 
unnecessary—and moreover, unrealistic.” Id. at 1078 (citation omitted). See also Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting position that IHL should inform judicial 
reading of AUMF).  
